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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I explain and analyse the concept of sympathy as Adam Smith describes it, then 
I present relevant research on empathy from the fields of social psychology and behavioural 
biology in order to compare the two concepts. I argue that this comparison shows that Smith’s 
theory is consistent with modern scientific research and thus a realistic account of human 
psychology, which renders his moral theory even more appealing. 
 
First, I introduce Smith by reference to his contemporary sentimentalism and faculty 
psychology, how stoicism influenced his theory of sentiments and the background of the 
teachings of Francis Hutcheson. Then I analyse Smith’s concept of sympathy by focusing 
mostly on his descriptive account of sympathy and analysing his normative project only when 
relevant to understanding the descriptive account. By illustrating with Smith’s example of a 
man who is a stranger to society, and how sympathy develops in him when introduced to 
society, I extract the main features of sympathy in order to compare these to contemporary 
scientific research. This man I compare to the myth of Narcissus in order to show that Smith 
has something different in mind with his example. I make use of Maria Carrasco’s analysis of 
the development of sympathy as well as Christel Fricke’s description of the circular form that 
the theory of Smith takes. I then comment on the challenge of circularity and propose a way 
of avoiding it, by focusing on the developing and educating features of moral sympathy and 
thereby reducing the importance of the objectivity of a static moment of sympathetic 
judgement of propriety. 
 
From this analysis, I describe sympathy as constructed of an immediate, precognitive kind of 
sympathy, but also a more developed kind of sympathy that is based on imagination and 
cognition, and this kind can be automatic as well as deliberate and conscious. Further, noting 
that sympathy can be both one-way and mutual, I summarise the sympathetic process as 
starting by the spectator imagining being another person, the agent, while maintaining one’s 
own perceptive, emotional and cognitive abilities and then judging of the information 
experienced from the imaginative act, agreeing or disagreeing with how the agent feels and 
acts. This creates the regulative process of mutual sympathy, aiming for harmonious or 
perfect sympathy between the spectator and the agent. 
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Turning to contemporary research, I focus on insights given by, most prominently, Damasio, 
Leary, Ekman, Batson, Preston & De Waal and Hurlbut. Here the main research is concerning 
theoretical presentation of emotions, the studies of mirror neurons and the behavioural 
research on emotional contagion, empathy, cognitive empathy as well as the role of self-
awareness. By comparing this research with Smith’s theory, I conclude that these are 
consistent views and that these different aspects of empathy describe the features of the 
development of sympathy, as I summarised them. I argue finally that this connection to 
empathy allows for the moral aspects of sympathy to avoid the static circularity by stressing 
the dynamic features of sympathy and its aim towards objectively judging of propriety. 
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Introduction 
 
Human nature has often been described as selfish and people are as such supposed to have 
no genuine concern for the wellbeing of others. Taking interest in other people is thereby 
interpreted as self-interest and therefore selfish; because we experience joy in doing good 
for others, we are only doing good for ourselves and not for others. It has always seemed 
dubious to me that intense and profound experiences of emotional bonds to others are taken 
to be no more than tools for selfish needs, and learning about the nature of empathy 
provided stronger opinions against this view. Theories on empathy seem to explain the 
possibility for genuine concern for others, not derived from selfish desires. When reading 
The Theory Of Moral Sentiments with this somewhere in mind, the connection became 
apparent that Adam Smith had also systematically analysed and theorised on this same 
subject. Although first published in 1759, and with methods of inquiry that can hardly be 
called scientific by today’s standards, his theory has many observations, insights and 
speculations that seem to be consistent with what modern research informs of today. Such 
information from science is an excellent resource for an investigation of Smith’s thoughts 
to see if they may be in some sense confirmed or disconfirmed. 
   
 It is a common understanding among Adam Smith scholars that the moral project in The 
Theory Of Moral Sentiments is based on an account of human psychology.1 By describing 
the way we in fact do think, feel and act, Smith develops a foundation for the way we 
should think, feel and act. This is to say, the basis of his theory of moral sentiments is on a 
theory of sentiments that are not from the beginning moral, but through social development 
and certain acts of the imagination, the sentiments eventually become moral. Smith 
describes sympathy as the sentiment that makes morality possible, and he begins with 
sympathy in its crudest form and explains how it transforms into a moral sentiment. The 
first object of this paper is to explain this process and to describe the nature of this 
development. This is a complex and multi-faceted process and is thus given an extensive 
analysis. 
 
Further, I shall mainly explore the psychological side of sympathy, and only briefly discuss 
the moral aspects. The purpose of this is to see how realistic this account is compared to 
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some modern research on the emotions, focusing on behavioural biology and psychological 
studies. Not surprisingly, when considering the nature of these fields, the behavioural 
biology studies provide a quite more unified view than psychology does, which is on this 
matter still in some debate. Therefore, I present the view of emotions in general and of 
empathy in particular that corresponds best to Smith’s theory, as the debates in psychology 
are not the subject matter of this essay. Competing views may well disagree with the 
selected studies, but it is the goal of this project to show the relevance of Smith and not the 
absolute truth of his theory. We therefore begin with following Smith’s notion of sympathy 
in its development. In order to do so with some illustration, we employ his example2 of the 
man who grows up in complete isolation and starts to develop character and normative 
traits as he begins to develop sympathy skills only when he meets with other people in 
society. 
 
Moral aspects of Smith’s theory will be discussed only when useful for these purposes or 
for a general understanding of sympathy. Because that moral project makes his concept of 
psychological sympathy especially important, it is necessary to discuss it briefly before 
turning to the contemporary part of this essay. Particularly, how we conceive of this moral 
project affects how we distinguish between the moral and psychological project of the 
theory. After analysing Smith and extracting the essential features of sympathy, I present 
the most relevant parts of the contemporary scientific view on emotions and relevant 
contemporary research on empathy. Then by comparing sympathy and empathy, I shall 
argue that not only is Smith’s theory still relevant, but that by the relevance of his insights, 
his moral theory may be shown to contribute to establishing empathy as an essential tool 
for moral thought and behaviour.  
 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments in context 
 
Smith was contemporary to the school of sentimentalism,3 a revision of classic empiricism. 
A sentimentalist account of the mind accepts the empiricist view of the human mind as 
shaped by experience, but holds that the mind is disposed to respond in a certain way to 
experience. Such reactions constitute 'sentiments', what we may informally recognize as 
attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, emotions and the like. Seeing as Smith is influenced by stoic 
  
7
thoughts on the cognitive content of emotions and the view that emotions are mainly 
voluntary,4 we can reasonably apply the stoic account of emotions to explain with more 
detail what the notion of sentiments contains. Here we apply solely the descriptive account 
of emotions offered by stoicism, and not the normative project.5 Emotions are here seen as 
not immediate and thoughtless, but with a cognitive content. They have an intentional 
object, of which the emotions express a value-laden belief. This belief has an essential “I-
reference,” the object is tied to the self by its relevance to our happiness. While the stoics 
limited cognition to involve linguistically expressible propositions, Martha Nussbaum6 
appropriately includes non-verbal cognitions among animals, children and many emotions 
in adult humans. 'Cognitive' here is in the most general sense of 'regarding receiving and 
processing information.' She further notes that emotions are classified together not only due 
to their shared specifications, but also because of how emotions relate to other emotions. 
We can thus have emotions about our emotions, and agreeing or conflicting emotions. 
 
Along these lines, we may understand sentiments as containing cognitions instead of seeing 
them as immediate, involuntary and thoughtless feelings. As they have an intentional 
object, they are, at least to a large degree, voluntary and controllable and as such, they are 
therefore open for Smith's thoughts on self-command, which are essential to his moral 
project. 
 
Smith was a student of Francis Hutcheson,7 who thought of the moral sentiments as 
belonging to a moral sense. Like our external senses such as vision and hearing, we also 
have internal senses that perceive of concepts. The moral sense approves of the concept of 
benevolence, but the problem of morality being the domain of a sense is that it renders the 
moral experience arbitrary to what this sense happens to approve, in the same way that we 
cannot help what tastes good (although our tastes may be cultivated). Smith, as it will 
become apparent, did not entertain an understanding of sympathy as a moral sense, rather 
sympathy is a tool of the imaginative and attentive mind that can be voluntarily employed. 
 
The mind, on the sentimentalist account, cannot be shaped in endless ways depending on 
experience, but responds in general ways to general kinds of experience. This view implies 
a possible difference between the experience of an object and the object in itself. The 
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challenge of such a difference is to justify that the experience of an object may lead to some 
sort of knowledge of the object in itself. In social philosophy, this challenge relates to the 
problem of other minds. If our own mind shapes our experience of another person, how can 
we say that we objectively know anything about that person? If we may achieve some sort 
of knowledge about that person’s behaviour, the challenge of knowing about the mental 
processes and mental states of that person remains. We shall see how Smith manages after 
a brief introduction.  
 
Smith’s explanations of social life belong to the school of faculty psychology. This school 
responded to the earlier view of the mind as uniform and of one essence, by viewing the 
mind as a set of faculties, each with its special features, and thereby ascribing a general 
kind of thinking to a particular faculty of the mind. A particular emotion or set of emotions, 
e.g., corresponds to a particular faculty or set of faculties. A modern version of this view of 
the mind is expressed by research in neuroscience on cognition and emotions in the human 
mind.8
 
The combination of sentimentalism and faculty psychology may generate a particular 
method concerning philosophy of mind: By describing how we generally respond, what our 
sentiments are, and by describing the essential features that several sentiments have in 
common, and distinguish themselves from other sentiments, the sentiments may be 
clustered as a set and then ascribed to a particular faculty of the mind. This is, as we soon 
shall see in detail, what Smith does with the sentiments generally involved in social 
interaction. 
 
Smith's understanding of sympathy 
 
Identifying the descriptive and the normative aspects of sympathy 
 
As mentioned, we are focusing on the descriptive account of sympathy, that is, the study of 
sympathy as a psychological phenomenon. Smith, however, is throughout his text often 
considering both psychology and morality at the same time. It is commonly agreed that his 
project becomes moral, or normative, with the introduction of the impartial spectator. It is 
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possible, however, to criticise Smith’s moral theory for becoming circular, which will be 
given focus and explanation later.9 When seen as circular the theory offers no elevation 
from psychology to morality; and because this is possible, it is thereby possible to consider 
the whole of his theory as concerned with psychological and descriptive aspects of 
sympathy. We therefore include the impartial spectator in the psychological account, as an 
analytical effort to understand the theory, not as a critique of circularity of argument and 
thus a lack of moral standard in Smith's theory. I do think there is a way out of the circle, 
but it is for the purposes of this essay not an important subject. Later, I therefore only 
briefly demonstrate a possible way out of the circle. 
 
The foundation of sympathy in human nature 
 
Smith introduces sympathy in the very beginning of his theory, which informs of his view 
on human nature: 
 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest 
him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from 
it, except the pleasure of seeing it.10
 
Those unselfish principles of human nature Smith identifies as sympathy, which motivates 
for benevolent actions and expressions of compassion, the “amiable” virtues. The selfish 
principles of self-love motivate to take care of ourselves in our lives, but overindulgence 
will be in conflict with benevolence and must thus be controlled. The control of emotions is 
the object of the “awful virtues” (in the sense of inspiring awe, not in the sense of being 
terrible).11 Guiding these virtues in practical application is the task of the intellectual virtue 
of prudence, “by which we judge well of the appropriate means to action.”12  
 
Selfishness can be understood as not opposed to sympathy, but entirely ignorant of it. The 
selfish passions are the 'original' passions.13 These are the emotions developed by the 
solitary man, whom is introduced below, prior to the introduction to society. It is notable 
that this sense of selfishness connects to what Smith terms ‘self-love,’ but it does not 
constitute his concept of ‘self-interest.’14 Rather, self-interest may more properly indicate 
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the interest of the totality of human nature, which is not only selfish but also unselfish by 
including sympathy.  
 
In The Wealth of Nations, “Smith normally talks of the ‘interest’ of an agent rather than the 
agent's ‘self-interest,’ let alone his ‘self-love.’ The ‘interest’ of an agent is not really a 
sentiment like self-love; instead, it refers to the bundle of material goods that an agent 
seeks, abstracting from the purposes to which those goods may be put, the emotional 
yearnings they may satisfy.”15 This insight to the economics of Smith may seem irrelevant 
to our discussion, but seeing how this is the most known and most misunderstood concept 
employed by Smith, it seems worth to clarify and distinguish from our discussion. All the 
same, it seems here that we can find the human nature in inner conflict between the two 
interests of selfishness and unselfishness, when these can, and often do, create opposing 
motivations. 
 
With this understanding of human nature, we can now introduce Smith’s thought 
experiment of the solitary man: 
 
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any 
communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or 
demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty 
or deformity of his own face. (...) Bring him into society, and he is immediately presented with the mirror 
which he wanted before.16
 
Let us name this man Adam (after his creator). An interesting aspect of this thought 
experiment becomes salient if we imagine that in his solitary place, Adam sees his 
reflection in the still surface of a pool for the first time, like Narcissus.17 Unlike Narcissus, 
Adam has never met people before, and according to Smith’s theory, this difference in 
social experience creates a significant difference in how they react to perceiving the images 
of themselves for the first time.  
 
Narcissus, acquainted to others but not his own image, thinks he sees another person and 
falls in love with this person, whom he finds extremely beautiful. Bending down to kiss this 
person, he thinks of his reflection as reciprocating his attempt to kiss and reaches into the 
water to embrace this supposed underwater-person. In some versions of the story, he falls 
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into the water and drowns, in other versions he becomes so disturbed by the ambiguous 
actions of his beloved that he lays down by the pool and dies of heartache. 
 
With Adam, the story would be quite different. Never having seen other people, he would 
not have formed an expectation of what people look like nor made any preferences of facial 
appearances, and could not judge of the “beauty or deformity of his own face.” In spite of 
the valuable lessons learned from the moral of the myth of Narcissus, it is unlikely that 
Adam would join Narcissus in thinking that he saw another person. At the very least, he 
should have been able to correct this false impression after some pondering of the 
mimicking expertise of either himself or of his new acquaintance, or of them both. In 
addition, reaching into the water should serve as a final, indisputable fact against his beliefs 
that he was seeing another person. However, realising that it is not an image of another 
person, does not entail a realisation that he sees his own reflection; it is unlikely that he, as 
he has no concept of self, would develop self-awareness in this situation. 
 
Nevertheless, this thought-experiment is not meant to show what Smith thinks would 
happen if a person actually grew up isolated from other people; it is constructed in order to 
see how self-awareness is contingent on social interaction. Both Adam’s concept of own 
character, how he is an individual with certain traits and qualities distinct from other 
individuals with their traits and qualities, as well as the ability to think of his character in 
normative terms, rely entirely on meeting other people and studying their reactions to him. 
The “mirror” of society, however, does not function in a manner similar to ordinary 
mirrors. The first awareness of this mirror develops similarly to the awareness of ordinary 
mirrors when first meeting people: 
 
Our first ideas of personal beauty and deformity, are drawn from the shape and appearance of others, not 
from our own. We soon become sensible, however, that others exercise the same criticism upon us. (...) 
We become anxious to know how far our appearance deserves either their blame or approbation. We 
examine our person limb by limb, and by placing ourselves before a looking-glass (...) endeavour (...) to 
view ourselves at the distance and with the eyes of other people.18
 
A similar process happens with the first formation of self-awareness. It is not the case that, 
on Adam’s first meeting with other people, they serve as direct mirrors of his character, 
propriety and demerit. He does not suddenly realise “so that’s what I am like, and this is 
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how I behave!” Instead, on his first meeting with other people, he is fascinated by how the 
“character and conduct of other people”19 affect him, and he becomes aware that other 
people judge likewise of his character and conduct. Becoming anxious to learn if their 
judgements are deserved, he imagines being the spectator of his own behaviour. Then by 
investigating his conduct in detail, corresponding to examining his “person limb by limb” 
he forms an impression of what other people observe when judging of him. This impression 
he then tries to process in a way similar to viewing “at the distance and with the eyes of 
other people.” These are the general outlines of the sympathetic process: to observe others, 
to imagine what they think and feel, and to form an opinion of their thoughts and feeling. 
The main point from this example with Adam is that sympathy is part of the functions of 
the mind that are entirely dependent on social life in order to develop. 
 
The nature of sympathy 
 
Smith describes sympathy as occurring in several examples between an agent, often 
referred to as 'the person principally concerned,' and a spectator.20 The most basic kind of 
sympathy is the one that arises from simply observing an emotion in another person, 
without any knowledge of the relevant situation.21 Here an emotion is “transfused” 
instantaneously. Maria Carrasco22 notes of this 'mechanical' form of sympathy that it is 
“one-way,” that is, the spectator sympathises with the agent, but it is not mutual. This is 
also the case with the next form of sympathy, but we shall later see the two kinds of 
sympathy that are by contrast “two-way” or mutual. These are the first social emotions of 
Adam, when introduced to society. They correspond to what we know as 'contagion' of 
emotion, especially prominent in the case of an infant starting to cry merely from the sound 
of another infant's crying. 
 
From this foundation, the most obvious parts of sympathy identify as “pity or compassion, 
the emotion which we feel for the misery of others.”23 However, we do not have fellow 
feelings with merely pain or sorrow, but: “Whatever is the passion which arises from any 
object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought 
of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator.”24 Sympathy, thereby, is more 
than pity or compassion; sympathy is “our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.”25
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Here, a new aspect is included: the thought of the situation of the agent. Smith further 
elaborates this aspect by identifying sympathy as a faculty not of the senses but of the 
imagination: 
 
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, (…) and become in some measure the same person 
with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in 
degree, is not altogether unlike them. (…) For as to be in pain or distress of any kind excites the most 
excessive sorrow, so to conceive or to imagine that we are in it, excites some degree of the same emotion, 
in proportion to the vivacity or dulness of the conception.26
 
This reaction is so automatic that it may be confused with being immediate like perception, 
but it is an active part of our mind belonging to the imagination. To Smith, such reactions 
are so instant and automatic that they can only occur from a natural desire of sympathy, as 
opposed to being a derivative from selfish desires instructed by long-term planning. With a 
basis in imagination, sympathy now entails a contextual reference to the sympathetic 
information, so the spectator, before sympathising, seems to judge of whether or not this is 
how he would feel if he were in that situation. Adam would here imagine what the agent 
experiences both perceptively, cognitively and emotionally.  
 
From this, Smith explains that sympathy arises more from observing the situation of 
another than from observing merely the passions of another, although both aspects are 
usually important for sympathy. To demonstrate, he presents several instances of the many 
situations wherein we have sympathetic emotions not felt by the principal agent, his most 
obvious example being that we sometimes sympathise with people who are dead and 
obviously cannot feel anything at all.27
 
This example raises an interesting issue: it seems that sympathy is now described as 
imagining being in the situation of the other, however, imagining being dead should be a 
difficult task, as it clearly involves nothing to imagine, by imagining not existing. Still, 
Smith clearly states that we imagine being dead by imagining placing our own living mind 
in a dead body, and thus experiencing what it would feel like to be dead, which we have 
noted would be impossible. We thus seem to keep certain aspects of our own perspective 
when we take the perspective of another, which may be problematic for an account of how 
we get information of another person’s subjective experience, unbiased by own interests. 
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This information does not need to be entirely unbiased, as it suffices to get an idea of what 
the other person is experiencing in order to make up an opinion. It is worth noticing here 
that Smith firmly held both points: we do keep some aspects of our own perspective in the 
imaginative transport into another persons experience, but we simultaneously also imagine 
completely being that other person. This last point is perhaps best stated in the example of a 
man imagining the pains of a woman in labour.28 There, it is impossible for the man to 
imagine himself in his own person being in that situation, so he then must imagine actually 
being the woman in question.  
 
Of these sympathetic experiences, Smith holds that they must arise from imagining being in 
the situation, but regarding it with own “present reason and judgement.”29 This implies that 
we bring our own senses and mental abilities in order to imagine the situation of another 
sympathetically, which, in turn explains why we prefer not to be buried alive and why men 
tend to dislike imagining being a woman giving birth. In both cases, being well informed of 
the situation, and imagining bringing with us our own senses and mental abilities to the 
point of view of the person principally concerned will produce sympathetic emotions. 
Imagining being in the situations ourselves, in our own person, however, does not occur.30 
Further, the emotions expressed by the person actually in the situation affects the process of 
sympathy, but they do not constitute the sympathetic emotions.  
 
Adam would now develop, by sympathetic experience, the ability to leave “himself behind” 
and enter more completely into the full, personal situations of others. We can thereby 
imagine that one becomes able to sympathise with an agent who has deficits in his 
perceptive, cognitive or emotional skills, by entering into their situation on the conditions 
set by such deficits. This will affect the sympathy process, a point most easily demonstrated 
by how we tend to be more sympathetic towards children as they usually have more 
limitations in regards to perceiving, understanding and emotionally reacting to a situation 
than adults do.  
 
The spectator must, as noted, on some level, agree with the emotions of the agent in order 
to sympathise. If the spectator, were he in the situation of the agent, would feel something 
similar to what the agent does in fact feel, then the spectator agrees with the agent and finds 
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the emotions of the agent to be proper. A brief presentation of Smith’s system of the 
emotions makes this process salient. 
 
Smith’s categories of emotions and how they evoke sympathy 
 
Smith categorises some passions as to their origin from the body, as opposed to those 
passions who originate in the imagination. Further, he categorises passions of the 
imagination as either habitual, or in the opposites of unsocial and social passions. Directly 
between the unsocial and the social passions, Smith places the selfish passions.  
 
Instances of the bodily passions are hunger, pain, and sexual desires.31 Bodily passions 
“(…) excite either no sympathy at all, or such a degree of it, as is altogether 
disproportioned to the violence of what is felt by the sufferer.”32 Only when those passions 
are associated to a situation that induces passions of the imagination, sympathy may 
activate to a proportionate degree.33
 
Instances of the passions of habitual imagination are love, friendship, and interest in studies 
and other occupations.34 We may associate these passions with idiosyncratic attitudes, 
which are constituted by personality traits of individual preferences. These passions evoke 
a similar degree of sympathy as the bodily passions, as the observer may not easily enter 
into the personal situations that produce them. Only when such passions are associated with 
social or unsocial passions, they evoke sympathy more easily. 
 
The unsocial passions are the different modes of hatred and resentment.35 Though these 
passions are similarly difficult to sympathise with for the agent who observes them, these 
passions are, for the agent, of more sympathetic concern than the previously mentioned. 
The sympathetic concern is in these cases fractured between the person who expresses 
unsocial passions and the person who is the object of those passions: “(…) we are 
concerned for both; and our fear for what the one may suffer, damps our resentment for 
what the other has suffered.”36 Thus, the person exhibiting unsocial passions must lower 
them in order for the agent to sympathize with them. 
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The opposite is the case with the social passion, instances of which are generosity, 
humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship, and esteem.37 When observing such 
passions, our sympathy is doubled, instead of divided, between the person exhibiting the 
social passions and the person made object of those passions. There is therefore no upper 
limit to those passions required for sympathy.  
 
The selfish passions,38 constituted by grief and joy, are the object of a degree of sympathy 
that falls in between the social and unsocial passions, as this sympathy neither divides nor 
doubles because it concerns affections affecting only their possessor. With grief, we 
sympathise more with more and less with less; with joy, our sympathy is conditioned 
oppositely.  
 
Now having explored the foundation and basics of sympathy, let us see how Smith explains 
the quality of the sympathetic experience, which introduces the two-way aspect of 
sympathy. 
 
Mutual sympathy 
 
Smith notes, “(...) nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling 
with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the 
appearance of the contrary.”39 This mutual sympathy is what connects the agent and the 
spectator; it is a bond that is anticipated in the sense that its absence shocks us but it is not 
necessarily expected in a strong way because we are quite pleased to observe it. In a way, 
we may say that it impresses us just as the food made by a master chef or the vocal 
performance of a virtuoso opera singer impresses us. Poor performance shocks us and we 
are overjoyed with what exceeds our expectations. Perhaps this tendency comes from the 
fact that the human mind is usually a solitary place, even in social situations with little or 
no sympathy, so when sympathy does occur the otherwise lonely state of mind connects 
with another and they are, simply put, happy together. Thus, we experience mutual 
sympathy to a certain degree as a joy and therefore of intrinsic value and not just the 
instrumental source of the benevolent virtues. From this, it follows that sympathy “(...) 
enlivens joy and alleviates grief. It enlivens joy by presenting another source of 
satisfaction; and it alleviates grief by insinuating into the heart almost the only agreeable 
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sensation which it is at that time capable of receiving.”40 Likewise, the agent is pleased 
from feeling sympathy to the person principally concerned and troubled from not feeling 
sympathy.  
 
From this description, it is reasonable to assume that Adam, upon meeting other people and 
experiencing this mutual sympathy for the first time, would feel overjoyed by the social 
bond it offers. Being a spectator and not used to mutual sympathy, he still feels compelled 
to sympathise with the agent that exhibits self-command by regulating his emotional 
expressions in order to achieve perfect harmony in the mutual sympathy from our once 
solitary, now turned social spectator, who in turn increases his sympathetic approval. In 
addition, as an agent himself, he will feel compelled to attune his behaviour to the 
sympathetic expressions of the spectator in order to achieve mutual sympathy. 
 
Following this process, Adam experiences something essential; he learns to judge of 
himself: 
 
We become anxious to know how far we deserve their censure or applause, and whether to them we must 
necessarily appear those agreeable or disagreeable creatures which they represent us. We begin, upon this 
account, to examine our own passions and conduct, and to consider how these must appear to them, by 
considering how they would appear to us if in their situation.41
 
Like Maria Carrasco points out,42 the agent becomes a spectator of the spectator, and 
imagines being him in order to judge of his sympathy. When an immediate harmony does 
not occur instantaneously between their emotions, the agent shows self-command by 
regulating his emotional expressions into something more agreeable, which will allow the 
spectator in turn to show more sympathy. This process is sustained until harmony in 
sympathy is obtained, that is, the spectator is sympathetic to the emotions of the agent and 
the agent finds this sympathy proper. Thus, the agent is provided with another point of 
view for regarding himself and considering the propriety of his emotions, while the 
spectator continuously re-evaluates the propriety of the emotions of the agent and thereby 
re-evaluates the propriety of his own sympathy. 
 
This mutual sympathy is the foundation for the 'principle of self-approbation and of self-
disapprobation,' or in other words our judgements concerning our own sentiments and 
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conduct.43 To Smith, this principle is “altogether the same with that which we exercise the 
like judgements concerning the judgements of the conduct of other people.”44 In order to 
make a judgement of our own “sentiments and motives,” we must: 
 
(...) endeavour to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them. 
Whatever judgement we can form concerning them, accordingly, must always bear some secret reference, 
either to what are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we imagine, ought to be the 
judgement of others. We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and 
impartial spectator would examine it.45
 
A comment on moral sympathy 
 
So far, the psychological account of sympathy has explained how we gain knowledge 
relevant for morality as well as motivation for being moral. However, it is not yet explained 
what this morality contains; we seem to be lacking a standard for moral judgement and 
conduct. Christel Fricke explains the circularity: “The impartial spectator sympathises with 
proper feelings exclusively. Those feelings are proper with which the impartial spectator 
sympathises.”46 Clearly, the circularity here needs to be avoided or solved. It seems that 
this circularity comes from focusing on a particular judgement of propriety. Indeed, such 
judgements are based on a standard that refers to sympathy and are thus circular, but I will 
argue in the following that they do imply a development towards objectivity and that they 
are therefore not trapped in this circular state. 
 
Although the impartial point of view provides a fair and impartial basis for judgement, it is 
not clear how this judgement is a moral judgement: By escaping the influence of selfish 
interests when judging from the impartial point of view does not exclude the possibility that 
our judgements remain subjective and relative to personal opinions, in the sense that they 
can be affected by personal values and principles that are not selfish but based on 
upbringing and cultural identity. For example, women wearing trousers was in the past 
thought of as improper whereas today most people think of it as entirely proper for almost 
all occasions. Because this is a value held as part of a personal belief-system, I think it is 
necessary to rule out such values as part of the mental tools we bring to the point of the 
impartial spectator. This is not implied in leaving behind the selfish passions only. There is, 
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then, no guarantee that the judgements of all people, who have normal mental health and 
mental abilities, and after taking the impartial position, will be judgements that are in 
agreement with each other. Therefore, this circularity emerges and we remain largely 
uninformed of the contents of morality. The question that remains unanswered, in my view, 
is what qualifies as impartiality, and what is impartial enough to account for morally 
objective judgements? 
 
The answer to this question is found when we focus not on the objectivity of present 
judgements, but on the objectivity of the ideal judgements. Sympathising is a learning 
process at which we develop gradually by exercise in taking the position of the impartial 
spectator. We may never reach total objectivity but it is still a goal worth pursuing. When 
reaching a high level of mastering this skill we may say that our judgements are objective 
not in the sense of true belief but in the sense of intersubjectivity. All people would agree 
with these judgements, were they to view them as impartial spectators. 
 
Thus as we improve our abilities of taking the position of the impartial spectator we 
gradually obtain more relevant information, both more minute details and a more general 
overview. An important part of this improvement lies in the ability of ignoring the 
sometimes urgent and powerful claims of the selfish emotions. The impartial point of view 
is here seen not as an absolute point, which exclusively contains qualities otherwise 
unobtainable, but a goal towards which we strive and by approaching it, we become 
increasingly impartial. Here, the argument is elevated into an upward spiral where the sense 
of propriety to the impartial spectator is continuously developed by the constant refinement 
of the sympathetic ability improving impartial perception and thus escapes circularity.  
 
Importantly, the position of the impartial spectator is therefore neither an ideal spectator of 
perfect knowledge nor the lowest common denominator of actually agreed sentiments; 
rather, it is something in between these two. On the one hand, it informs of something 
everybody would agree on from an impartial point of view, so it is not ideal in the sense of 
perfect and complete information but it is not misinformed by selfish emotions. The ideal 
spectator is a concept that requires perfect knowledge and thus becomes impossible for men 
to achieve. However, according to Smith we do construe an idea of perfection, albeit 
possibly vague. This comes from admiration of the expert or genius. Admiration consists of 
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“approbation heightened by wonder” and the common object of which is “the great leader 
in science and taste.” We approve of his judgements “not as something useful, but as right, 
as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality: and it is evident that we attribute those 
qualities to it for no other reason but because we find that it agrees with our own.”47 By 
observing a “moral expert,” we are then informed of, what to us appears as an ideal way of 
judging and conducting, and by such observations we form an idea of an ideal moral agent 
and how such an agent judges and acts and this entails an idea of virtue or of excellence.  
 
This relates to Smith’s conception of the first standard of judgement, where the object of 
our judgement is compared to “the idea of complete propriety and perfection (...) in 
comparison with which the actions of all men must for ever appear blameable and 
imperfect.”48 This is to say that when judging of the conduct and emotions of others, or 
ourselves we compare it to an idea of perfection. Smith does not explain how this idea 
emerges in our mind, but we may interpret this to imply imagining feeling and acting 
perfectly attuned to the sentiments of the impartial spectator. This involves the ability 
completely to leave the original point of view and the selfish passions, which is for Smith 
what limits our possibilities for becoming identical in judgement with the impartial 
spectator. 
 
 
On the other hand, the impartial point of view informs of something everybody would 
agree on when not misguided by selfish emotions, it is therefore reasonable to exclude 
those commonly held sentiments that qualify as judgements informed by selfish emotions, 
such as opinions based on resentment put in system and institutionalised.49 Smith thinks 
that to obtain sympathetic judgements of perfect propriety often “requires no more than that 
common and ordinary degree of sensibility or self-command which the most worthless of 
mankind are possest of, and sometimes even that degree is not necessary.” This relates to 
Smith’s second standard of judgement, which involves comparing the object of our 
judgement to “(...) the distance from this complete perfection, which the actions of the 
greater part of men commonly arrive at.”50 We can interpret this to be an idea of what we 
generally expect of people, not what we are impressed by or disappointed of but rather a 
neutral baseline; it is an idea formed from our sympathetic experience of social acts and 
feelings. By applying both these standards we get a perspective from which we can 
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comparatively place the object of our judgement along a one-dimensional line ranging from 
blameworthy through neutral to praiseworthy, approaching complete perfection in the 
infinite distance: “Whatever goes beyond this degree [of common actions], how far soever 
it may be removed from absolute perfection, seems to deserve applause; and whatever falls 
short of it, to deserve blame.”51
 
 
These two standards shape the view of the impartial spectator: it does not entail objectivity 
in the sense of a purely rational mind deducing logical consequences from universal moral 
rules. Rather, it entails an intersubjectivity aiming at a universality, which includes the 
approval of all of humanity and thus a perspective that provides the clarity of perception 
and judgement necessary to form moral judgements. From this foundation, Smith 
constructs his moral theory, which focuses mainly on the virtues of self-command and 
benevolence and prudence. We shall not investigate further on morality in Smith, but 
instead summarize his concept of sympathy. 
 
The main aspects of sympathy 
 
Sympathy, as we have described, has several levels of functioning. The immediate kind 
occurs without cognition, but the imaginative part of sympathy entails rich cognitive 
content. In addition, some of the sympathetic imagining may be fully automatic, while 
more complicated abilities such as taking the position of the impartial spectator may require 
quite active and deliberate thinking. We also noted that sympathy can be one-way as well 
as mutual. The sympathetic process starts by imagining being another person while 
maintaining one’s own perceptive, emotional and cognitive abilities and thereafter forming 
a judgement of the information gathered. This judgement consists in agreeing or 
disagreeing with the actions and feelings of the other, according to the extent one would act 
and feel in the same way. In mutual sympathy, this creates the regulative process both of 
the sympathy of the spectator and of the actions and feelings of the agent, which has 
harmonious sympathy as its goal. As we have noted, the notion of propriety is an important 
aspect of sympathy, one that develops along with the training of sympathetic skills. We 
now can turn to exploring modern research on empathy. 
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Contemporary research relevant to Smith  
 
Emotions in general 
 
In psychology, there are a number of discussions on the nature of emotions, but for our 
context, the focus limits to the neurobiology of emotions, and social and cognitive 
components, especially self-awareness. 
 
Regarding the neurobiology of emotions, Antonio Damasio summarizes:  
 
Most emotions are responsible for profound changes in both the body and the brain. Moreover, note that 
emotions are not feelings. It is only when the brain manages to make a coordinated representation of all the 
emotional changes in the form of images that we come to feel an emotion. Note, finally, that it is only 
when we have consciousness that we come to know that we feel an emotion.52
 
This coordinated representation of emotional changes as images relates to the foundation of 
Nussbaum’s concept of the cognitive contents of emotions as described earlier. We may 
say that this is the informational source that tells us how we feel and what general emotion 
we are experiencing, but it does not inform of the object of the emotions. This requires 
more reflection about oneself in relation to one’s surroundings. As noted, Smith had self-
awareness as a prerequisite for all the social emotions, including sympathy. Leary53 
specifies that being able to self-reflect makes our emotional life “far more extensive and 
complex,” and that having a self permits people to “(1) evoke emotions in themselves by 
imagining self-relevant events, (2) react emotionally to abstract and symbolic images of 
themselves in their own mind, (3) consciously contemplate the cause of their emotions (4) 
experience emotions by thinking about how they are perceived by other people, and (5) 
deliberately regulate their emotional experience.” (1) and (2) are associated to Nussbaum’s 
notion of the “I-reference” of emotions; but more importantly, (3) and (4) concern the 
information gained from sympathy and (5) describes Smith’s central idea of self command 
which is so important for mutual sympathy. In addition, the ability of imagination that is 
crucial to Smith is here given much emphasis. Self-awareness seems thus to be of 
importance on several levels concerning sympathy. Salovey goes even further in saying that 
“the emotions themselves are social processes.”54 This implies that Adam would have no 
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emotions prior to socialising, not even the original passions. Instead, his original passions 
could be the simplest forms of affect and lacking all of the five features mentioned above.  
 
As to cognition in emotions, Scherer55 claims that modern psychology, although affected 
by the tradition of seeing emotion as an “impediment to the proper functioning of the 
pinnacle of cognition – rational thought, (…) the Zeitgeist seems to be dominated  by 
efforts to integrate rather than oppose cognition and emotion.” The tendency in modern 
research is here a shift towards conceiving of emotions as allied to cognition in the manner 
Smith illustrated. A problem here will be to define cognition consistently. 56 It is agreed 
that a basic understanding such as Nussbaum’s, where cognition simply is general 
processing of information, allows emotions to have cognitive content. However,  
 
the challenge that confronts modern emotion research is to specify with increasing precision the types of 
cognitive operations that may be critical to the emotion-generation process and to identify the neural 
circuitry that differentially subservers emotion and cognition. We also need to study the two-way 
interaction between these systems.57  
 
These ongoing studies are relevant to Smith’s view of emotions, but we have seen that the 
basics of general cognition are corresponding to the main view of Nussbaum’s account, 
which we argued was seemingly fitting Smith’s view. Further, focusing on empathy will 
inform of the cognitive aspects of this particular emotion, which is sufficient for the 
purposes of this discussion. With this general outline of emotions, the specifics of empathy 
may now be addressed.  
 
Empathy 
 
Not unlike ’sympathy,’ ’empathy’ is a term that has several different meanings and 
connotations, also in science. Batson, one of the main researchers in social psychology on 
the field of altruism, outlines a general historical view, starting in 1909 when Titchener 
translated the German term ‘einfühlung.’ This meant intuitively seeing something from the 
inside. Through several changes over the years, ‘empathy’ has since the late 1970’s come 
“to refer to one particular set of congruent vicarious emotions, those that are more other-
focused than self-focused, including feelings of sympathy, compassion, tenderness and the 
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like (Batson et al., 1981,1983; Coke et al.,1978; Toi & Batson, 1982).”58 Later, Batson 
takes ‘empathy’ to mean “an other-oriented emotional response congruent with the 
perceived welfare of another. If the other is perceived to be in need, then empathic 
emotions include feelings of sympathy, compassion, tenderness, and the like.”59 This 
definition Batson employed to operationalise empathy for his experimental studies of the 
empathy-altruism hypothesis, which claims that “empathy evokes motivation directed 
toward the ultimate goal of reducing the needy person’s suffering; the more empathy felt 
for a person in need, the more altruistic motivation to have that need reduced.”60 This 
hypothesis is an alternative to three classes of egoism that may explain altruism: reward 
seeking, punishment avoidance and aversive-arousal reduction. Batson concludes that in 
the more than 25 experiments conducted, the results have shown “[w]ith remarkable 
consistency (…) patterns as predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Results have 
failed to support any of the egoistic alternatives.”61
 
This we may take to demonstrate to large extent what we know from Smith to be the 
motivational factor of sympathy; it is genuine concern for the needs of others, and not 
selfish concerns, that motivates unselfish action. However, for our purposes it is not 
sufficient with this operationalised version of ‘empathy’. To see that empathy may have the 
same meaning as sympathy we need a more detailed definition. Therefore, we continue 
from this starting point in social psychology and continue towards behavioural biology. 
Here, Preston and De Waal divide the subject matter into three classes, emotional 
contagion, empathy and cognitive empathy.  
 
‘Emotional contagion’ is the process by which a spectator or observer is in an emotional 
state as “a direct result of perceiving the emotional state of another.”62 This process 
includes all kinds of emotions, and one familiar example is the phenomenon of how infants 
start to cry simply from hearing the cries of other infants. ‘Empathy’ “refers to situations in 
which the subject has a similar emotional state to an object as a result of the perception of 
the object’s situation or predicament.”63 ‘The subject’ is here an observer of the emotional 
state of another, namely, ‘the object.’ Empathy contrasts to emotional contagion, in which 
the subject experiences strong emotions that are self-focused. With empathy, on the other 
hand, the emotions focus on the object. Furthermore, here empathy is viewed as a process 
more than a result, so therefore “(…) an incidence may still qualify as empathy even if the 
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subject’s beliefs about the object are incorrect or if their states do not exactly match.”64 
This kind of empathy has evidence in several animal studies, including experiments with 
rodents,65 experiments with monkeys66 and behavioural data on apes.67
 
 ‘Cognitive empathy’ refers to a “shared state that is arrived at through cognitive means, as 
when the distress of the object is displaced spatially or temporally, when the situation of 
distress is unfamiliar, or when the object of distress is unfamiliar.”68 Several primates and 
even rodents have exhibited empathy in experiments but cognitive empathy is so far only 
shown in humans and great apes.69 Chimpanzees managed to transfer knowledge by 
perspective taking when reversing roles in a different task requirement experiment, but 
monkeys did not manage the same task.70 There is in cognitive empathy a higher order of 
cognitive processes employed which do not employ in ordinary empathy where problem 
solving is not required. 
 
Summarising these aspects, Hurlbut71 describes, “this extraordinary capacity [empathy] is 
built on a combination of evolutionary ancient emotional responses and more recent 
anatomical and neurological innovations unique to primates and highly refined in human 
beings.” Further, Paul Ekman's studies show that specific emotions correlates with physical 
manifestations such as facial and bodily expressions, which lead to defined central, and 
autonomic nervous system changes. Hurlbut concludes “(…) that there are no subjective 
(psychological) states without psychological correlates. Thus emotions are simultaneously 
both inward and outward realities; they are intrinsically bodily based and have visible 
expressive manifestations which can be drawn on in the communication process.”72 In 
these studies, the ancient emotional responses, identified as emotional contagion, receive a 
biological foundation.  
 
This foundation further develops with the study of “mirror neurons” in monkeys, neurons 
which fire both when observing a specific action and when performing the very same 
action. Mirror neurons seem to be the underlying neurological mechanism of all three 
classes of emotional contagion, empathy and cognitive empathy. The findings of this study 
suggests that we can expect the same to be the case in humans as in monkeys, and “that we 
comprehend the motions of another by a kind of low-level imitation of the same action, 
thereby feeling both the action and something of its concomitant psychological context and 
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intention.”73 Preston & De Waal describes this phenomenon as an organisation of both 
perception and action in a “common code of representation in the brain,” which  
 
(…) may include abstract, symbolic representations (Prinz, 1997). Thus, in the case of emotions, the 
representations need not just map body postures and facial expressions directly from actor to perceiver; 
they can also map the meanings or goals of the expressions.” 74
 
This point shows that mirror neurons may be the foundation not just of simple emotional 
contagion, but also of understanding the emotions of the agent in context to the situation.  
 
Comparing empathy to sympathy 
 
We can already note several obvious similarities to Smith. Emotional contagion connotes to 
the immediate and automatic nature of the sympathetic process: 
 
When we see a stroke aimed, and just as ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally 
shrink and draw back our own leg or arm; and when it does fall, we feel it in some measure, and are hurt 
by it as well as the sufferer.75
 
We may take these studies to further address Smith’s thoughts about sympathetic responses 
as immediate and automatic, and therefore not a derivative from selfish attitudes or 
emotions. Empathy as described here is remarkably similar to sympathy, being an other-
focused process of observing the situation of the other, resulting in a similar emotional state 
but not necessarily identical. All this is included in Smith’s sympathy as key features. 
Cognitive empathy too, we recognize with Smith’s description. The cognitive perspective 
taking here is what Smith described as imagining “(…) we place ourselves in his situation 
(…).”76 However, as Hurlbut stressed, this ability is highly refined in humans and we 
should therefore not take this to signify that that chimpanzees in the studies actually 
imagined being the other. It is more likely that they imagined being in the situation as 
themselves and not as the other, as Smith describes sympathy. This highly refined ability is 
developed by human beings only. Cognitive empathy requires self-awareness, as Hurlbut 
points out,77 which starts to develop in the human child between the first and second year 
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of life, and begins differentiating between animate and inanimate along with deepening the 
conscious personal identity. This is continued by the awareness of other selves and 
“indiscriminate emotional contagion is superseded by cognitive empathy, a willed and 
knowing stepping into the role of the other.”78 Here, the argument on escaping the 
circularity of sympathetic judgement previously discussed becomes relevant. As 
mentioned, by focusing on the progressive nature of sympathy, the circularity can be 
avoided. This feature of cognitive empathy stresses this point of developing skills as it 
implies the improvement of the skill by exercise and heightening one’s self-awareness and 
awareness of other selves. In other words, the willed and knowing stepping into the role of 
the other is developed by repetition. 
 
This corresponds to Smith's thought-experiment of Adam and the development of his self-
awareness through social interaction. Self- awareness is on both accounts the beginning of 
developing the imaginative ability of taking the point of view of another. Because empathy 
may replace sympathy in Smith’s moral theory, empathy can be considered as a tool for 
moral thinking and acting, it is an active part of the moral mind, precisely in the way Smith 
described sympathy to be. 
 
The studies of mirror neurons explain the immediacy and urgency of the sympathetic 
response while it avoids reducing sympathy to a moral sense similar to Hutcheson’s 
account with no cognitive content because of voluntary focus. Instead, sympathy is an 
immediate response that allows focus to be directed at the other and the sympathetic 
reaction develops by imagining being the other and judging of the information processed 
by this imaginative act. We see here that the mirror neurons as well as the development 
from emotional contagion through empathy and towards cognitive empathy are all features 
coherent to the sympathetic process as described by Smith. 
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Conclusion 
 
Smith’s view of the nature of emotions is in all the main aspects consistent with the modern 
view. In addition, now having a more precise understanding of empathy that is synonymous 
to sympathy, we can indeed apply Batson’s study of the empathy-altruism hypothesis to 
address the motivational function of sympathy. Also, the biological studies show that 
empathy also contains an explanation for Smith’s informational aspect of sympathy, both 
by the low-level mirror-neuron imitations of actions and defined central and autonomic 
nervous system changes as well as by the higher level cognitive empathic information of 
the situation of another. Importantly, by explaining the role of empathy and its possibilities 
as a highly refined feature of human mental skill, the point of improving one’s sympathetic 
abilities becomes salient. Thereby, it becomes easier to focus on the educating and 
developing aspects of moral sympathy and thus avoiding the circularity of the standard of 
judgements of propriety. The Theory Of Moral Sentiments is based on ideas and 
observations that are in no way obsolete but on the contrary still quite relevant and thus the 
moral project of Adam Smith seems realistic on this account. I hope that research that is 
more thorough can elaborate on the connection between Smith and scientific studies on 
empathy, extending far beyond the initial comparison made here and perhaps aiming 
towards establishing empathy as an essential tool for moral thought and action. 
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